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"STACKING" DEDUCTIONS FOR SPECIAL USE
VALUATION AND MINORITY DISCOUNT
— by Neil E. Harl*
Farm and ranch businesses for many years have been
eligible for discounts for minority interest and for non-
marketability.1 Since 1976, farmland used in a business has
been eligible for special use valuation at death for federal
estate tax purposes.2 The question has been whether the two
types of discounts could both be claimed with respect to the
same property.
Nature of the discounts
A discount for minority interest and for non-
marketability, often between 20 and 30 percent, has been
allowed for stock interests in many closely held
corporations including farm and ranch corporations.3
Undivided interests held as community property4 or in co-
ownership such as tenancy in common5 have also been
subject to a substantial discount, often in the range of 15 to
20 percent.6
The discount for special use valuation has been limited
to a maximum reduction (of the gross estate) of $750,000.7
The actual reduction in value depends upon the outcome of
the cash rent capitalization formula8 or the five-factor
formula for valuation.9 A 30 to 60 percent discount has
been possible in recent years with even greater discounts in
the 1970s.10
Can both sets of discounts be used?
Until 1989, no formal determination had been made as
to whether a discount could be obtained for a minority
interest and for non-marketability in addition to the
reduction in value based on special use valuation. It had
been generally believed that such "stacking" of discounts
was not permissible and in that year the Tax Court decided
a case confirming that outcome.11 In that case, Estate of
Maddox,12 the Tax Court held that for stock valued at a
discount by virtue of special use valuation, a minority
discount was not also available.13
In the 1994 case of Estate of Hoover,14 the Tax Court
again confirmed that position in denying an attempted 30
percent minority discount for a 26 percent interest in a
limited partnership engaged in cattle ranching followed by
special use valuation of the land.15 However, that decision
has been reversed on appeal with the Tenth Circuit Court of
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Appeals holding that both sets of discounts may be
available if the special use valuation limit of $750,000 has
been reached.16 In Hoover, the estate had first subtracted the
$750,000 maximum reduction of gross estate and then
applied the minority interest discount.
The court in Hoover noted that the earlier Maddox
case17 had not involved the $750,000 limit on special use
valuation. The appellate court distinguished Hoover from
Maddox and held that "a proper determination of fair
market value necessarily must consider the decedent's
minority interest and discount for it."18 Thus, the discount
for minority interest and non-marketability should first be
applied to determine fair market value and the special use
valuation reduction in gross estate (up to $750,000) could
be claimed.
With that reasoning, an estate electing special use
valuation could first reduce fair market value by the amount
of the discount for minority interest and for non-
marketability and then take the lesser of special use value or
the value produced by the discount for minority interest and
non-marketability. In the event special use value was more
than $750,000 below the "fair market value" set by the
discount for minority interest and non-marketability, the
special use value reduction would be limited to the
$750,000 figure. In that situation, the estate would receive
the benefit of both discounts. Otherwise, if the $750,000
minimum reduction of the gross estate was not at issue, the
estate could claim the lesser of the special use value or the
value after claiming the discount for minority interest and
non-marketability.
Another factor to consider
In analyzing the availability of the two separate sets of
discounts, it is important to note that special use value
applies only to land and not to value represented by
machinery, equipment or livestock. The discount for
minority interest and non-marketability applies to
ownership interests regardless of the nature of the
underlying property. Therefore, the portion of value
attributable to non-real estate should arguably be eligible
for a minority interest and non-marketability discount even
though the land is valued under special use valuation.
To date, neither IRS nor the courts have recognized that
distinction.
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1 See generally 8 Harl, Agricultural Law § 58.05[2][c]
(1995); Harl, Agricultural Law Manual § 7.02[5][d]
(1995).
2 See generally 5 Harl, Agricultural Law § 43.03[2]
(1995); Harl, Agricultural Law Manual § 5.03[2] (1995).
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4 Propstra v. U.S., 680 F.2d 1248) (9th Cir. 1982).
5 See, e.g., Est. of Youle v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1989-
138 (discount of 12-1/2 percent allowed for tenancy in
common ownership); Est. of Cervin v. Comm'r, T.C.
Memo. 1994-550, appeal docketed, 5th Cir. August 31,
1995) (20 percent discount allowed for 50 percent
interest in farm and homestead). But see Ltr. Rul.
9336002, May 28, 1993 (discount should be limited to
cost of partitioning property).
6 See, e.g., Est. of Pittsbury v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1992-
425 (15 percent discount allowed for undivided 77
percent and 50 percent interests in real estate).
7 I.R.C. § 2032A(a)(2).
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9 I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(8). See 5 Harl, supra n. 2, §
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
AUTOMATIC STAY. The debtors farmed land leased
from a related person on a 60/40 crop share basis. The land
owner had a mortgage against the farm under a note co-
signed by the debtors and the debtors had made all the
payments on the note. The debtors' Chapter 12 plan provided
for payment of the note in full. The lender initiated a
foreclosure action against the land owner without first
seeking relief from the automatic stay. The court held that,
although it would have been prudent for the lender to first
seek relief from the automatic stay, the foreclosure suit did
not violate the stay because the suit was against a nondebtor
and would not affect the debtors' rights under the lease. In re
Smith, 189 B.R. 11 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1995).
CLAIMS. A secured creditor had obtained a pre-petition
judgment of foreclosure against the debtor but the
foreclosure sale was stayed by the debtor's bankruptcy
petition. The Bankruptcy Court set a bar date for creditors'
claims and the order required all disputed claims to be filed
by the bar date and made all creditors responsible for
verifying the accuracy of claims filed by the debtor. The
creditor obtained relief from the automatic stay and
proceeded with the foreclosure sale. Once the sale was
completed and the deficiency amount determined, the
creditor finally filed a claim, more than one month after the
claims bar date. The creditor sought approval for the late
filing under Bankr. Rules 9006(b)(1) for excusable neglect
or 3003(c)(3) for good cause. The Bankruptcy Court held
that the late filing was allowed under Rule 3003 because the
delay in filing was caused by the creditor's waiting for the
foreclosure sale to be completed in order to determine the
amount of the claim. The District Court reversed, holding
that Rule 3003 could not be used to allow the late filing,
under Pioneer Inv. Services v. Brunswick, 507 U.S. 380
(1993). In addition, the District Court held that the creditor
did not comply with the Rule 9006 excusable neglect
standard because the creditor intentionally delayed the claim
filing until after the foreclosure sale. Agribank v. Green,
188 B.R. 982 (C.D. Ill. 1995).
ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP COSTS. The debtor
had operated a trucking business at a facility leased from a
creditor. The lease provided that the debtor was responsible
for any costs of cleaning up environmental damage caused
by the debtor during the lease. After the debtor filed for
bankruptcy, the lease was rejected by the debtor and the
landlord had the property inspected for environmental
damage. The state (New Jersey) environmental quality
agency required a number of cleanup actions and the
landlord sought recovery of those costs as administrative
expenses. The court held that the cleanup costs were not
entitled to administrative priority because the costs were
incurred post-petition and the environmental hazards were
not an imminent hazard to public health and safety. In re
McCrory Corp., 188 B.R. 763 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1995).
EXEMPTIONS
IRA. The debtor claimed a federal exemption for the
debtor's interest in an IRA. The trustee objected to the
exemption on the basis that the debtor was not entitled to
